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HOLOCAUST AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: 
THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL 
CONFERENCE 
PROSECUTORS'SYMPOSIUM: NEW JURISDICTIONS 
Michael S. Bernstein Memorial Panel 
United States .................................... Eli M. Rosenbaum! 
Canada .................................. WilliamJ.A. Hobson, Q.C.2 
Australia ......................................... Graham T. Blewitt3 
Great Britain ...................... William G. Chalmers, C.B., M.C.4 
Moderator: ...................................... Allan A. Ryan, Jr. 5 
Owen Kupferschmid: The first panel that you will be hearing today is 
a panel of prosecutors and government officials from the United 
! Principal Deputy Director, United States Justice Department's Office of Special Inves-
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Law, 1987-89, General Counsel, 1978-87, Counsel, 1972-78, Canadian Department of 
Justice; Q.C., 1979; L.L.B., Osgoode Hall Law School, 1965; B.A., University of Toronto, 
1962. 
s Director, 1991-present, Deputy Director, 1988-91, Special Investigations Unit for War 
Crimes; Senior Legal Advisor, National Crimes Authority, 1985-88; Director, Public Prose-
cutions, New South Wales, 1974-88; Diploma in Law, University of Sydney, 1974; Leaving 
Certificate, De La Salle College, King's Grove, 1964. 
4 War Crimes Inquiry, 1988-89; Chairman, Industrial Tribunals, 1984-88; Crown 
Agent for Scotland, Procurator Fiscal Society, 1948-84; B.L., Aberdeen University, 1948; 
Roberts Gardens College, 1933-39. 
• Office of General Counsel, Harvard University, 1985-present; Special Assistant, At-
torney General of the United States, 1983; Director, United States Justice Department's 
Office of Special Investigations, 1980-83; Assistant, United States Solicitor General, 1977-
80; law clerk, Associate Justice Byron R. White, United States Supreme Court, 1970-71; 
J.D., University of Minnesota, 1970; A.B., Dartmouth College, 1966. 
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States, Canada, Australia, and Great Britain. We have named this 
panel the Michael Bernstein Prosecutor's Symposium. I would like 
now to call on the moderator for that panel, Allan A. Ryan, Jr., to 
say a few words. 
Allan Ryan: Thank you. Michael Bernstein was the Assistant Deputy 
Director of the Office of Special Investigations (OSI) at the De-
partment of Justice. He graduated from the University of Michigan 
and the University of Chicago Law School and held a masters 
degree from Johns Hopkins University. He came to OSI in 1985 
from the Washington, D.C. law firm of Covington & Burling. Mi-
chael Bernstein supervised scores of major war crimes investigations 
at OSI, and he bore the principal responsibility for over one-fifth 
of all deportations secured by that office. He was a pioneer in the 
investigation and the prosecution of SS personnel from the Mat-
thausen concentration camp, and was lead counsel in OSI's prose-
cution of a number of SS guards from Auschwitz as well. Michael 
was the point man for the Justice Department on the passage of 
legislation designed to strip Nazi war criminals of their social se-
curity benefits. And on top of all that, he also successfully defended 
a major Freedom of Information Act lawsuit. 
In December of last year, Michael went to Austria to put the 
final touches on an agreement with the Austrian government to 
take back the Austrian Nazis deported from the United States. To 
put this event in perspective, it was in 1980, nine years ago when I 
was with OSI, that I first raised this issue with the Austrians, and 
at that time they firmly declined to entertain any such suggestion. 
It is a tribute to Michael's abilities that he was able to get the 
Austrian government finally to agree to take back Austrian Nazi 
war criminals. 
On December 22, 1988, Michael was returning to Washington, 
D.C. on Pan Am flight 103. He was murdered, along with all others 
on that flight, when a terrorist's bomb exploded in the plane's cargo 
hold. Michael Bernstein was thirty-six years old. He leaves his wife, 
Stephanie, and two young children. Michael Bernstein gave his life, 
not only in the service of his country, but in the pursuit of human 
rights. He was a man whose breadth of intellect was matched only 
by the depth of his compassion and by his commitment to the 
principles with which we concern ourselves at this Conference. He 
gave his life for those principles. Let us live for those principles. 
I have here a letter addressed to the Conference from the 
Attorney General of the United States: 
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I was very pleased to learn that the Boston College Holo-
caust/Human Rights Research Project has named a panel of its 
annual international conference in memory of the late Michael 
S. Bernstein, Assistant Deputy Director of the United States 
Department of Justice Office of Special Investigations. 
Mike Bernstein's memory is appropriately, and perhaps 
uniquely, honored by this tribute at Boston College. Mike died 
as he lived, acting in the service of his country pursuing a cause 
in which he deeply believed. He was carrying home the fruits 
of an important victory he had achieved in Vienna-an agree-
ment he negotiated with the Austrian government, paving the 
way for the deportation of Nazi war criminals. That achieve-
ment will serve as lasting evidence of Mike's patience, determi-
nation, and legal and diplomatic skills. 
Mike's success in Vienna came as no surprise to those who 
knew him and worked with him. It was the latest in a long line 
of remarkable victories he achieved during his tenure at the 
Department of Justice. Moreover, his contributions will continue 
as cases he developed are brought to successful conclusions. We 
will not forget his devoted service in the cause of justice. As 
President Bush wrote to Mike's family shortly after Mike was 
murdered, his work "set a noble example of what public service 
in the pursuit of justice can accomplish." 
As Attorney General of the United States, and on behalf 
of the entire Department of Justice, I commend you for your 
studies of human rights law and I thank you for commemorat-




On behalf of the Boston College Law School Holocaust/Human 
Rights Research Project, we would like to present this plaque to Eli 
Rosenbaum, who is representing the Office of Special Investiga-
tions. We present this plaque to the Bernstein family in memory of 
Michael Bernstein. 
Eli Rosenbaum: Thank you very much. I would like to add a few 
personal thoughts to amplify what Allan has already said and what 
the Attorney General has said in his very moving letter. 
Mike Bernstein was a brilliant advocate, a first-rate legal scholar, 
and a trusted advisor and friend. He also was someone on whom 
6 Letter from Richard Thornburgh, United States Attorney General, to the Boston 
College Holocaust/Human Rights Research Project (Mar. 17, 1989) (copy on file at the Boston 
College Third World Law Journal office). 
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the Department of Justice could, and did, rely for leadership of 
OSI when Mr. Sher, Mr. Einhorn, and I were unavailable. Profes-
sionally, I recall most of all Mike's tenacity as a seeker of justice. To 
cite but one example: he could often be found in our central file 
room late in the evening searching for new cases to investigate and 
new leads to pursue. Mike was indefatigable in his work and un-
yielding in his commitment to justice. 
Because of Mike's reputation as a litigator par excellence, the 
defendants in his cases almost invariably settled, agreeing before 
trial to give up their ill-gotten U.S. citizens hips and leave the coun-
try. So, one of Mike's greatest frustrations was that he never actually 
got to go to trial. We ribbed him frequently about that. Indeed, 
there was a joke at OSI among our junior attorneys that if you 
wanted to get trial experience, you should try your best not to get 
assigned to a case with Mike Bernstein. I have no doubt, however, 
that Mike would have performed as magnificently in court as he 
did out of court. 
Mike was a kind, caring, modest person. I recall seeing him 
lose his temper only once-when he felt that the West German 
government was failing to make a good faith effort to bring to 
justice a defendant whom OSI had deported to Germany. It still 
seems remarkable to me that such a gentle individual could be so 
exceptionally effective as a prosecutor. He remains, in my estima-
tion, the role model for all of his colleagues at the Department. 
Mike earned the respect and affection of everyone with whom 
he worked at OS!. We remember him professionally as an enor-
mously gifted and dedicated prosecutor, and we remember him 
personally with deep, abiding affection as a friend. Most impor-
tantly, we will think of Michael always as a loving husband and son 
and a devoted father to his two beautiful children. I thank you on 
behalf of Mike's family, who cannot be here this morning, and on 
behalf of the entire Department of Justice. It is a wonderful thing 
that you are doing in his memory. Thank you. 
Allan Ryan: It is appropriate, I think, that this symposium is being 
held in Michael's memory, since a great value of this Conference 
has always been the opportunity it provides for prosecutors and 
investigators who are exploring Holocaust and human rights crimes 
to come here to Boston, to meet each other, to learn from each 
other's work, and to share their knowledge with all of us. The 
opportunity to come together in front of a select audience is one of 
the great values of this Conference, and one I hope will endure. 
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Nearly ten years ago, when the Office of Special Investigations 
was created at the Department of Justice, one of my first priorities 
as Director was to meet with my counterparts-if that is the right 
word-in other parts of the world. At that time, I found that the 
United States was the only country, with the sporadic exception of 
the Federal Republic of Germany, that was actually prosecuting Nazi 
war criminals. This was, of course, due largely to the fact that the 
United States waited so long to do anything, while Germany, East 
Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, France, and 
other countries had largely completed their work years before. It 
was certainly true ten years ago that those countries that had re-
ceived the largest number of post-war immigrants from Europe-
the United States, Canada, Australia, and, to some extent, Great 
Britain-had done relatively nothing. I take more irony than satis-
faction in the fact that a decade later the United States finds itself 
the leader in Nazi war criminal prosecutions in the English-speaking 
world, even having undertaken this task as belatedly as we did. 
Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom all began for the first 
time to address the presence of Nazi war criminals in their countries 
after 1979. 
We are fortunate to have with us this morning senior prose-
cutors from these countries, as well as my former colleague Eli 
Rosenbaum from the Office of Special Investigations. I have asked 
each of them to speak on the state of affairs in his country, and to 
tell us where his country is going in the investigation and prosecu-
tion of Nazi war criminals. 
Eli is the Deputy Director of the Office of Special Investigations 
and has been with that office since 1980, with the exception of a 
couple of years in the mid-1980s, when he was General Counsel for 
the World Jewish Congress. He was instrumental in bringing to the 
world's attention the record of Kurt Waldheim, who, although he 
remains in office, has become a pariah. I was glad to hear that Eli 
went back to OSI a year ago, and I am very glad that he could be 
with us today. 
Eli Rosenbaum: Thank you. It is amazing for me, having witnessed 
the birth of this Project only a few years ago, to see how far it has 
already progressed. It is a small miracle, I think, that the Project 
has taken off as it has, and that there could already be a Fourth 
International Conference like this, with eminent authorities flying 
in from all over the world. It is wonderful to see good friends here, 
especially the people who have organized these conferences from 
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the very beginning: Owen Kupferschmid, Bill Mandell, Ruti Teitel. 
Pardon me, now it is Professor Ruti Teitel. 
It is very, very good to be here this morning. I have been asked 
to update this Conference on OSI's progress during the last twelve 
months. Permit me to put the work of our office in context for 
those of you who are not familiar with it or who were not here last 
year, when my colleague, Bruce Einhorn, represented OSI.7 We 
were set up ten years ago as a direct result of legislation enacted by 
Congress in 1978 expressly to render Nazi persecutors deportable 
from the United States. That legislation was introduced and cham-
pioned by then-Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzman, and that is 
now known in her honor as the Holtzman Amendment.8 Our juris-
diction in these Nazi cases is civil rather than criminal; we are limited 
to instituting denaturalization and deportation proceedings.9 Den-
aturalization suits, which have as their goal the revocation of United 
States citizenship, are based on charges of fraudulent and/or illegal 
procurement of citizenship.lO These cases are tried in Article III 
federal courts. II In contrast, our deportation cases are tried in the 
various U.S. immigration courts around the country.12 Many of our 
deportation cases actually originate as denaturalization cases; once 
the defendant in a denaturalization case has exhausted his oppor-
tunities for appeal, we then-and only then-are able to commence 
deportation proceedings against him. 13 
It is a frustratingly slow process. Moreover, these cases are, 
from an evidentiary perspective, extremely difficult. The proceed-
ings are being commenced more than forty years after the events 
in question, and the crimes were generally committed in such a way 
that most or all of the witnesses who might be willing to testify were 
murdered in the course of those crimes. Furthermore, while some 
captured Nazi documentation of specific crimes exists, its utility is 
7 In 1988, Bruce J. Einhorn was Deputy Director (Litigation), Office of Special Inves-
tigations, United States Department of Justice. 
s See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(33), 1251(a)(19) (1978). 
9 See generally Elliot M. Abramson, Reflections on the Unthinkable: Standards Relating to the 
Denaturalization and Deportation of Nazis and Those Who Collaborated with the Nazis During World 
War II, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 1311 (1989); Stephen]. Massey, Individual Responsibilityfor Assisting 
the Nazis in Persecuting Civilians, 71 MINN. L. REV. 97 (1986); Jeffrey A. Evans, Comment, 
Denaturalization/Deportation: What Standards for Withdrawing the Welcome Mat?, 23 U.S.F. L. 
REV. 415 (1989). 
10 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1451(aHi) (West Supp. 1991). 
II See id. § l451(a). 
12 See 8 C.F.R. § 242 (1991). 
13 See Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922). 
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usually very limited, particularly with respect to identifying the 
perpetrators. Most of the documents that the Nazis and their acol-
ytes created were destroyed during the war. Only a fragment sur-
vives, and of necessity we rely very heavily on that fragment. 
When OSI was established ten years ago, our friends and sup-
porters candidly told us that they had very limited expectations. 
Their explanation went something like this: "You will be lucky if 
you gather sufficient evidence to file a handful of cases-perhaps 
four or five denaturalization cases at most. And if you win one or 
two denaturalization suits, we will consider that a victory, because 
you will have vindicated the rule of law, and you will also have put 
all of these criminals on notice that tomorrow their day in the dock 
may come as well. But we don't expect you to succeed in actually 
deporting anyone. That would, in any event, take more years than 
are available, due to the advanced ages of these people and the 
seemingly endless appellate opportunities afforded defendants in 
these cases. Moreover, what country would accept these Nazis even 
if they could be deported?" 
Well, I am very pleased to be able to report to you this morning 
that OSI's record thus far has vastly exceeded those pessimistic 
predictions. To date, we have succeeded in stripping thirty-one Nazi 
persecutors of their U.S. citizenship, and we have deported, extra-
dited, or otherwise removed from this country twenty-five Nazi 
persecutors. Three of the individuals removed from the United 
States have already been tried and convicted overseas: Feodor Fe-
dorenko in the Soviet Union,14 Andrija Artukovic in Yugoslavia,15 
and Ivan Demjanjuk in Israel. 16 
14 In 1984, Fedor Fedorenko was the first person to be deported from the United States 
to the Soviet Union to face Nazi war crimes charges. See In re Fedorenko, No. A-7-333-468 
(Immigration Court, Hartford Feb. 23,1983), afl'd 19 I. & N. Dec. 57 (BIA 1984). In June 
1986, Fedorenko was sentenced to death by a court in the Crimea in the Soviet Ukraine on 
charges of treason and for taking part in mass executions at the Treblinka death camp in 
Poland. William J. Eaton, Soviets Execute Ex-Nazi Guard Deported by U.S., L.A. TIMES, July 28, 
1987, at 9. See generally Barbara J. Swartz, Note, Denaturalization of War Criminals After 
Fedorenko, 15 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 169 (1982). 
15 Andrija Artukovic was deported from the United States to Yugoslavia in 1986, where 
he died in prison on January 18, 1988. See In re Artukovic, 628 F. Supp. 1370 (C.D. Cal.), 
stay denied sub nom. Artukovic v. Rison, 784 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1986); ALLAN A. RYAN, JR., 
QUIET NEIGHBORS: PROSECUTING NAZI WAR CRIMINALS IN AMERICA 142-90 (1984). 
16 In 1986, John (Ivan) Demjanjuk was extradited to Israel. See In re Extradition of 
Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544 (N.D. Ohio), petition for writ of habeas corpus denied sub nom. 
Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 612 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Ohio), afl'd, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985), 
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986). Demjanjuk was sentenced to death by an Israeli court in 
1988 after being convicted of mass murder at the Treblinka death camp in Poland. See John 
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Our cases have run the gamut. At one extreme, one might cite 
the case of Andrija Artukovic, who was the Interior Minister of the 
Nazi puppet state of Croatia during World War II; or the case of 
Otto Albrecht von Bolschwing, who was an aide to Adolf Eich-
mann. 17 At the other end of the "prominence spectrum," one would 
find the majority of our cases, which involve what one might call 
the "trigger pullers" of the Holocaust, the people who actually 
carried out Hitler's plans: concentration camp guards, members of 
mobile killing units, collaborationist police officials-the nameless, 
faceless people who actually committed the bulk of the crimes. 
OSI's record to date, which I believe is an exceptionally positive 
one, is primarily a tribute to the dedication of the people who make 
up our staff-people, of course, like Mike Bernstein. It also reflects 
the dedication and professionalism brought to OSI (and its prede-
cessor office) by the four individuals who have served at its helm, 
starting with Martin Mendelsohn, and then, in succession, Walter 
RockIer, Allan Ryan, and Neal Sher. 
I would like to turn now to the promised update of OSI's 
activities during the past year. We filed six cases in court during the 
last twelve months. 18 All of these are what we at OSI call "self-
generated" cases. These are, in other words, cases involving indi-
viduals against whom we have received no allegations from foreign 
governments, from survivors, or from any other source. They came 
to our attention as a result of our systematic efforts over the past 
several years to check against V.S. immigration rolls the tens of 
thousands of names we have extracted from captured Nazi person-
nel rosters~oncentration camp guard lists, Einsatzgruppen person-
nel rosters, and the like. We transmit these thousands of names to 
the V.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, which then com-
pares them by name (and, where available, date of birth) with 
information in the INS database of persons who have immigrated 
to this country during this century. That is actually the manner in 
Demjanjuk on His Way to Court, THE INDEPENDENT, Aug. IS, 1991, at 10. His appeal is currendy 
pending before the Israeli Supreme Court. Ohad Gozant, New Evidence Challenges 'Naz.i Ivan' 
Conviction, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Aug. IS, 1991, at 7. 
17 See RYAN, supra note IS, at 243-44. 
18 In re Dorth, No. A08-194-183 (Immigration Court, Chicago filed Jan. 10, 1989); 
United States v. Schmidt, No. 88-C-9475 (N.D. III. filed Nov. 8,1988); United States v. Inde, 
No. 3-88-570 (D. Minn. filed Aug. 22, 1988); United States v. Kauls, No. 88-808-PHX-
RCB (D. Ariz. filed May 24, 1988); United States v. Didrichsons, No. C-88-686-C (W.D. 
Wash. filed May 27, 1988); United States v. Kirsteins, No. 87-CV-964 (N.D.N.Y. filed July 
IS, 1987). 
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which OSI has generated nearly all of its cases during the last several 
years. 19 
As I said, OSI filed six cases in the past years; five of them 
denaturalization cases. We brought suit in Phoenix against Juris 
Kauls, the former inspector of the guards at the Riga concentration 
camp system in Latvia. We instituted proceedings against Valdis 
Didrichsons in Seattle; during the war, Didrichsons served in the 
Arajs Kommando-a mobile killing unit that also was based in Riga, 
Latvia. Two of Didrichsons' comrades-in-crime from the same unit 
were also located in the United States and prosecuted: Mikelis Kir-
steins in Syracuse, New York, and Edgars Inde in Minneapolis, 
Minnesota. In addition, we filed a denaturalization action in Chicago 
against Michael Schmidt, who was a guard at the Sachsenhausen 
concentration camp. During the past year, we also filed one depor-
tation case in Cleveland against Johann Dorth, a former SS-man at 
the Auschwitz death complex in Poland. 
OSI won five court orders of denaturalization in the past year. 
The first was against Antanas Virkutis, who was a warden in a prison 
in Nazi-occupied Lithuania.20 The second was in Detroit against 
Peter Quintus, who was an SS guard at the Majdanek death camp 
in Lublin, Poland.21 Quintus' denaturalization order was obtained 
through a consent agreement, in which he admitted to his service 
at Majdanek and to his participation in Nazi-sponsored acts of 
persecution there. We also won a default judgment against Juris 
Kauls,22 whom I mentioned before; Kauls fled the United States 
shortly after we instituted proceedings against him. One of Mike 
Bernstein's cases was also brought to a successful conclusion this 
year: Stefan Reger, who was an SS guard at the Auschwitz complex 
in Poland, had summary judgment entered against him in federal 
district court in Newark, New Jersey.23 Finally, and perhaps most 
notably, OSI also won a case in the United States Supreme Court 
this year against J uozas Kungys, whom we charged with being in-
volved in atrocities in Lithuania during World War II. On May 2, 
1989, the Supreme Court validated the test of "materiality" in these 
19 See RYAN, supra note 15, at 246-72. 
20 United States v. Virkutis, No. 83-C-1758 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 8, 1988) (consent judgment 
of denaturalization). 
21 United States v. Quintus, No. 87-CV-70950-DT (E.D. Mich. June 29, 1988) (consent 
judgment of denaturalization). 
22 United States v. Kauls, No. 88-808-PHX-RCB (D. Ariz. Sept. 7, 1988) (default 
judgment). 
2' United States v. Reger, No. 87-4906 (D.N.]. Sept. 8, 1988) (summary judgment). 
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cases for which the government had argued.24 Unfortunately, how-
ever, when the Court then remanded the case to the same federal 
district court judge before whom we had unsuccessfully tried the 
case initially, we had little choice but to settle the suit. The agree-
ment subsequently reached with Kungys required him to give up 
his U.S. citizenship.25 Although we will not be able to deport him, 
he is certainly not "out of the woods" yet, so to speak; he still faces, 
as do all of these people, the possibility of extradition if another 
government so requests. 
During the past year, OSI removed four persons from the 
United States. Like the previously-mentioned Juris Kauls, Stefan 
Reger fled the country for West Germany shortly after we brought 
proceedings against him. The third was a case that had been in the 
courts for several years (originally as a denaturalization case), that 
of Conrad Schellong, who had admitted that he was an SS guard 
supervisor at the Dachau concentration camp; he was deported 
during the past year to West Germany.26 Finally, there is the case 
of Boleslavs Maikovskis-a case that also had been in the courts for 
many years.27 Because Maikovskis faced the possibility of deporta-
tion to the Soviet Union, he opted to, in effect, self-deport by fleeing 
secretly to West Germany, which coincidentally was the same coun-
try we had originally sought to designate during the deportation 
trial. In what I believe was an extraordinary piece of international 
detective work, his whereabouts in West Germany were traced by 
OSI's own investigators in a matter of weeks. They were able to 
ascertain not only the country to which Maikovskis had fled, but 
also his precise hiding place in Germany.28 Maikovskis is now under 
arrest and will likely stand trial in Muenster shortly. 
24 See Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759 (1988). For an analysis of Kungys and the 
materiality standard, see Kirsten Aasen, Comment, United States v. Kungys, 3 GEO. IMMIGR. 
L.]. 387, 390-400 (1989); Shari B. Gerstein, Note, United States v. Kungys: Clarifying the 
Materiality Starulard in Denaturalization Proceedings?, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 429, 449-57 (1989); 
Mary C. Stakun, Note, Materiality in the Denaturalization Context: Kungys v. United States, 23 
CORNELL INT'L LJ. 161, 171-84 (1990). 
25 United States v. Kungys, No. 81-2305 (D.N.]. Nov. 14, 1988) (consent judgment of 
denaturalization). 
26 See In re Schellong, No. AI0-695-922 (Immigration Court, Chicago Sept. 5, 1984), 
afl'd, No. AIO-695-922 (BIA July 11, 1985), afl'd sub nom. Schellong v. INS, 805 F.2d 655 
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1004 (1986). 
27 See In re Maikovskis, No. A8-194-566 (Immigration Court, N.V.June 30,1983), rev'd, 
A8-194-566 (BIA Aug. 14, 1984), afl'd sub hom. Maikovskis v. INS, 773 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 
1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1172 (1986); see also RYAN supra note 15, at 60,357-58. 
28 To put this in context, one might consider the Federal Bureau of Investigation's "Ten 
Most Wanted" list. Presumably, almost all of the fugitives on that list are, unlike Maikovskis, 
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I would like to touch briefly on some other highlights of OSI's 
activities during the past year. We have added numerous individuals 
to the so-called "watchlist"-the database that is maintained by the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service and the United States De-
partment of State of suspected Nazi criminals who are to be denied 
entry into this country.29 The most celebrated person on the list is, 
of course, Austrian President Kurt Waldheim, whose name was 
added in 1987.30 In May of this year, we added two thousand 
additional names to the list, gleaned from archives around the 
world, of individuals who served in the Einsatzgruppen-mobile kill-
ing units that Germany sponsored during World War II. Later, we 
added the names of individuals who were tried and convicted of 
war crimes by the French government after the war. Moreover, I 
can report, happily, that the watchlist actually works quite well. In 
recent years, at least several dozen people have been denied visas 
by the State Department when their names have been found on the 
watchlist during the visa application process. While these people 
can challenge the State Department's decision, very few of them 
have in fact sought to do so. Also, with the cooperation of INS, we 
have stopped a number of people at U.S. borders who have some-
how managed to get U.S. visas or have departed from countries 
whose residents are not required to obtain U.S. visas in order to 
visit this country. 
Finally, a few brief words about our opponents. OSI has been 
under attack for many years now by groups that, frankly, would 
like to see us put out of business. Most of these groups either are 
based in the extremist fringe of the American political scene-neo-
Nazi organizations, Holocaust denial groups, and the like-or else 
they are based in the Ukrainian and Baltic communities. Significant 
still present somewhere inside the United States. Most of them, however, have stayed on the 
list for years even though virtually every law enforcement officer in the United States has 
been looking for them. For example, murder suspect Leo Joseph Koury, one of the "Ten 
Most Wanted," has been listed since April 1979 (footnote provided by panelist). 
29 The statutory basis for such exclusion was added to Title 8 in 1978. See 8 U .s.C. 
§ 1182(a)(33). 
30 Waldheim, the former Secretary General of the United Nations, was the subject of 
media disclosures, beginning in March 1986, concerning his wartime activities in the Balkans 
while serving as an intelligence officer with the German Army. See, e.g., John Tagliabue, Files 
Show Kurt Waldheim Seroed Under War Criminals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4,1986, at I;John McCaslin, 
U.S. Bars Waldheim Because of Nazi Past, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1987, at 1. See generally 
Allegations Concerning Kurt Waldheim, Hearing Before Subcommittee of Human Rights and Inter-
national Organizations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); INVES-
TIGATION OF KURT WALDHEIM'S WORLD WAR II ACTIVITIES, H.R. Doc. REP. No. 607, 99th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). 
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elements of the leadership of these communities have worked dili-
gently over the years to try to derail our efforts. I must say, happily, 
that these organizations and activists have been quieter in the past 
year than in recent years. I hasten to add, however, that two major 
organizations, both based in the Baltic community and set up for 
the sole purpose of doing battle with the Office of Special Investiga-
tions, continue to be active. 
We have seen in the past year a resurgence of activity among 
the supporters of John Demjanjuk, who was extradited to Israel in 
1986.31 Even though that case has become primarily an Israeli legal 
matter, his friends have not given up the fight in this country. They 
have brought various kinds of lawsuits against the Department of 
Justice and its officials. That, of course, is unquestionably their 
right. Lately, however, some of them have taken the campaign to a 
new low-to a strategy that apparently embraces the tormenting of 
Holocaust survivors, including an elderly man who was an inmate 
at Treblinka during World War II and who now lives in Switzerland. 
Although this man was a prisoner in the Treblinka camp, he was 
held, as Demjanjuk's people well know, far away from the gas 
chambers, and is therefore unable to make any identification of the 
operators of those gas chambers. Yet, he is being harassed with 
phone calls and all kinds of other invasions of his personal privacy. 
It has gotten to the point where Demjanjuk supporters-including 
one who is here today, I gather-have taken to distributing a doc-
tored transcript of a telephone conversation with this particular 
survivor. That, to me, is cruel and absolutely unconscionable. 
I will close by saying that under no circumstances will we be 
deterred by these campaigns; we have not been thwarted in the 
past, and we will not be in the future. Indeed, we are more active 
than ever, with more than six hundred cases currently under in-
vestigation. We have a talented staff of lawyers, historians, and 
investigators that is dedicated to pursuing these cases. The Attorney 
General has made it clear that he backs us fully. We are pleased, 
moreover, that we now have colleagues working on Nazi cases in 
both Canada and Australia-and I hope, in the near future, in the 
United Kingdom as well-and we at OSI look forward to expanding 
the international cooperative efforts that are already underway. 
I am anticipating a very busy and productive year for our office. 
Thank you again for inviting me here this morning. 
" See Michael Hedges, U.S. Nazi Hunters Railroad "War Criminal", Experts Say, WASH. 
TIMES, Sept. 24, 1990, at AI. 
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Allan Ryan: Thank you, Eli. Mr. William J. A. Hobson is the senior 
General Counsel to the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes 
Division of the Canadian Department of Justice in Ottawa. Before 
that, he was the Assistant Deputy Attorney General of the Criminal 
Law Division. He is the Director of General Counsel to the Vancou-
ver and Toronto offices of the Canadian Department of Justice, 
and he is now very actively involved in the prosecution of Nazi war 
crimes cases in Canada. 
William J. A. Hobson Q.C.: Thank you, Allan. I would like to start 
by noting what an honor it is as a Canadian to participate in this 
panel. For some of you who were not here earlier, there is a reason 
for me to feel particularly honored by my inclusion in this panel, 
as it has been dedicated as a tribute to my American colleague at 
law, Michael Bernstein. To put it simply, Michael Bernstein was a 
man of great dignity, and in my mind he will always be a hero. In 
his lifetime, Michael realized the importance of being a part of 
history, and of helping others to tell their story in the pursuit of 
justice. He died tragically in this pursuit. I can echo the words of 
Allan and Eli about what a sweet man and what a competent man 
he was. In my mind, Michael cared, which was demonstrated by the 
fact that he participated in addressing past evils to prevent future 
wrongs. 
I would like to speak to you today about the a~tions the Ca-
nadian government has taken to address squarely the problem of 
war criminals in Canada. In part, we have sought to accomplish this 
by ensuring that the Nuremberg principles32 and internationally-
recognized concepts of war crimes and crimes against humanity will 
form a permanent part of Canadian law. I would also like to speak 
to you about Canada's efforts to complete the work that was begun 
by the Canadian Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals33 to 
ensure that all those involved in past crimes and crimes against 
humanity would be brought to account. Our work in this field is 
extraordinarily important, not only because of the horrendous 
S2 See generally Gary Komarow, International Responsibility, 29 INT'L & COMPo L.Q. 21 
(1980); Dr. Hans Laternser, Looking Back at Nuremberg Trials with Special Consideration of the 
Process Against Military Leaders, 8 WHITTIER L. REv. 557 (1986); Oscar Schachter, In Defense 
of International Rules and the Use of Force, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 113 (1986). 
ss The Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals was established by Order No. 1985-
348 of the Privy Council For Canada, approved by the Governor General on February 7, 
1985. See L.C. Green, Canadian Law, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, 59 BRIT. Y.B. 
INT'L L. 217, 221 (1989). 
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crimes committed in the years before Nuremberg, but because the 
last forty years have borne witness to the commission of other crimes 
in other regions and in other conflicts. It was very important to me 
to see the panel we had yesterday afternoon discussing past conflicts 
and the problems that the panelists have encountered in bringing 
about justice for these mass murders. 
To meet the need for precise factual information on a number 
of alleged war criminals in Canada, and to identify the appropriate 
avenues of legal redress, the Commission of Inquiry on War Crim-
inals was established by the government of Canada in 1985 under 
the leadership of the Honorable Mr. Justice Jules Deschenes, Chief 
Justice of the Quebec Superior Court. 34 The Commission's report,35 
presented on December 30, 1986, provided a basis upon which the 
government has been able to act decisively and quickly. (For those 
of you who attended the Conference last year, you will recall that 
Mr. Justice Deschenes was one of the panelists.) The Deschenes 
report identified suspected war criminals who had come to Canada, 
and stated that if the government chose to proceed with its rec-
ommendations, such suspects should be dealt with on a priority 
basis.36 You will hear from others today about the difficulties that 
are encountered in trying to proceed in this fashion. The Commis-
sion also noted that in conducting further investigations, serious 
evidentiary difficulties would be encountered: the passage of more 
than forty years and the formidable national, political, and linguistic 
differences that must be overcome in order to collect the necessary 
evidence, of which I will give some examplesY In all cases, the 
pursuit of an investigation must involve at least one Eastern Bloc 
country, and in some cases, in order to establish the subject's iden-
tity, you must go through five countries. Mr. Justice Deschenes felt 
that a determined effort could achieve the necessary result within 
the framework of existing Canadian institutions. The Deschenes 
Report recommended specifically that the Canadian Royal Mounted 
Police and the Department of Justice be required to deploy suffi-
cient resources to pursue the investigative process and to take what-
ever legal actions were warranted.38 
3. [d. 
35 CANADA, COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON WAR CRIMINALS REPORT, PART I: PUBLIC (Ottawa: 
Minister of Supply and Services, Canada, 30 December 1986) (Commissioner: J. Desch~nes) 
[hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT]. 
36 [d. at 827-88. 
37 [d. at 869-91 (App. I-M). 
38 [d. at 829-30. 
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The government responded to this recommendation by adopt-
ing a "Made in Canada" approach. This means that all people who 
have committed crimes in foreign countries shall be brought to 
account in Canada in a manner consistent with Canadian standards 
of law and evidence, and in accordance with the overriding prin-
ciples established by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms.39 This approach also takes into account existing Canadian 
laws, which allow for extradition,40 denaturalization,41 and 
deportation42 on the basis of rulings by Canadian courts and tri-
bunals. All existing Canadian laws will be resorted to as appropriate. 
I would like to take a few moments to discuss certain aspects 
of our Criminal Code Amendments. The legislation in Canada 
strictly conforms to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 
and, for this reason, is not retroactive. Section ll(g) of our Charter 
provides that no person may be found guilty of an offense unless 
at the time of the act's commission it constituted an offense under 
Canadian or international law, or was criminal according to the 
general principles of law recognized by the community of nations.43 
This provision is essential to an understanding of the manner by 
which the Canadian government has proceeded in the amendments 
to its Criminal Code, as it makes these standards of fairness a 
reference point for Canadian jurisdiction over both past and future 
war crimes. The definitions of "war crimes" and "crimes against 
humanity" in Canadian legislation44-and in the jurisdiction created 
to try these crimes-have, therefore, been shaped by international 
standards of conduct such as the Geneva Conventions,45 the Nurem-
berg Principles,46 and customary international law. It remains to be 
seen to what extent the law will adopt these principles. We believe 
that the existing law is not one of retribution or retaliation. The 
law grants Canadian courts the jurisdiction to try only those inter-
national crimes that at the time of their commission would have 
39 CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms), ch. II. 
40 Extradition Act, R.S.C., ch. E-21 (1970), amended by R.S.C., ch. £-23 (1985). See 
generally 12 CANADIAN ENCYCLOPEDIC DIGEST (Ont. 3rd) Title 61 (1991). 
41 Citizenship Act, R.S.C., ch. C-29 (1976). 
42 Immigration Act, R.S.C., ch. 1-2 (1977). 
.. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms), ch. II. 
44 Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 6(1.96) (1985), amended by ch. 37, 1987 s.C. ll05. 
45 See, e.g., Geneva Convention, Protection of War Victims, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 V.S.T. 
3517, T.I.A.S. No. 3365. 
46 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
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constituted an offense in CanadaY The legislation applies to both 
past and future events; it is not limited to events surrounding the 
Second World War.48 
It is useful to consider more fully the jurisdictional basis of this 
law. The amendments to the Canadian Criminal Code reflect both 
the traditional jurisdiction of courts over nationals of warring coun-
tries and the evolving notion of "universal jurisdiction."49 One of 
the sections also reflects the traditional jurisdiction of courts over 
the prosecution of crimes committed in the course of war. 50 States 
that were parties to a particular armed conflict have a right under 
international law to prosecute such war crimes. Over the course of 
time, however, other bases of jurisdiction have been developed and 
recognized in international law. The most important of these is the 
principle of "universal jurisdiction," which provides that persons 
who commit certain types of crimes are to be considered for all 
practical purposes international criminals. 51 War crimes and crimes 
against humanity are two examples of crimes covered by the prin-
ciple of universal jurisdiction-torture is another. 52 To explain the 
principle in another way, there is growing international agreement 
that certain acts are clearly so heinous that they create a right on 
the part of any nation to try the offender if he is found within the 
nation's borders. Because of the gravity of the crimes falling within 
the ambit of this principle, the protected rights of the accused are 
of particular concern in the development of implementing legisla-
tion.53 
Any trial conducted under the Canadian legislation affords the 
accused all the procedural safeguards and rights of fair and equi-
table treatment to which the accused would be entitled in any crim-
47 Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. G-46, § 6(1.91) (1985), amended by ch. 37, 1987 S.C. 1105. 
48 Id. 
49 For a discussion on the evolving standards of universal jurisdiction, see generally 
Christopher L. Blakesley, A Conceptual Framework for Extradition and Jurisdiction and Extrater-
ritorial Crime, 1984 UTAH L. REV. 685, 688-717 (1984); A.R. Carnegie, Jurisdiction Over 
Violations of Laws and Customs of War, 39 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 402, 405 (1963); William B. 
Cowles, Universality of Jurisdiction Over War Crimes, 33 CAL. L. REv. 177 (1945); Kenneth C. 
Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REv. 785, 788 (1988); Rena 
Hozore Reiss, The Extradition of John Demjanjuk: War Crimes, Universal Jurisdiction, and the 
Political Offense Doctrine, 20 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 281, 301-07 (1987). 
50 Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. G-46, § 6(1.91)(a)(ii), (iii) (1985), amended by ch. 37, 1987 
S.C. 1105. 
51 Randall, supra note 49, at 789. 
52 17 CANADIAN ENCYCLOPEDIC DIGEST (Ont. 3rd) Title 81 § 381 (1991). 
55 Id. 
1992] HOLOCAUST AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 1989 17 
inal trial before the Canadian courts. 54 In addition, any defenses 
available to the accused under international law, both at the time of 
the crime's commission and at the time of the trial, remain available 
to him.55 In redressing historical wrongs, it is essential that the 
traditional rights of the accused under our criminal law be pre-
served. 
In Canada, we are often asked why cases that have been iden-
tified by the Commission of Inquiry have not yet proceeded through 
our courts. Last year, the Attorney General said the short answer 
to this question was that no case will proceed until sufficient evi-
dence is available for the government to present a responsible case. 
But I would like to tell you what the Canadian Commission of 
Inquiry actually said. In addition to reviewing hundreds of cases, 
the Commission has taken special care to put certain cases in a 
confidential report. Because of the detailed and serious allegations 
contained in the report, the Commission also recommended that 
these cases be given high priority by the government. The cases 
have been and are being given high priority, but, as with all cases, 
no proceeding is possible until the necessary evidence is available. 
The Commission did not go abroad to locate witnesses and obtain 
their evidence; this job was left to the Canadian government. In 
fact, Mr. Justice Deschenes himself noted that if the government 
chose to proceed with the Commission's recommendations, a mon-
umental effort would be needed to forge ahead with speed in 
organizing the work, accessing the results, and counseling foreign 
governments on the investigation of war crimes. 56 The Canadian 
government can only institute proceedings in the courts in cases 
where the evidence to substantiate the allegations can be assembled. 
The Commission did not do this work, and so it has become the 
government's job to see that it is done correctly. More negotiations 
have yet to be undertaken, and arrangements with foreign govern-
ments have yet to be made. 
Under these circumstances, I submit that it makes no sense to 
suggest the government of Canada is dragging its feet in the pros-
ecution of war crimes, or that it is merely duplicating the work of 
the Commission. The Commission made it clear that the success of 
war crime endeavors is wholly dependent on the cooperation of 
54 Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 6(1.92), (1.93) (1985). amended Uy ch. 37, 1987 S.C. 
1105. 
55 Id. 
56 COMMISSION REPORT. supra note 35, at 891-92 (App. I-M). 
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foreign governments in determining whether proof of the crime 
still exists.57 If you look at this panel, and at what our colleagues in 
European countries are doing, you will understand that the com-
petition among us for the time of foreign governments, in order to 
work on these cases, has increased dramatically in recent years-a 
fact I note with some sense of pride. There is a new entrepreneurial 
spirit that has to be brought to bear in gaining the attention of 
foreign governments such that these cases may be processed in an 
efficient and effective manner. I think people are overlooking this 
fact. My colleague, Neal Sher, deserves a great deal of credit for 
convening a multilateral conference among a number of govern-
ments in which we all made considerable headway. As a represen-
tative of the Canadian government, I am of course almost constantly 
working on the foreign relations aspect of these cases. I finish three 
weeks of trial and I head off to Europe for a few weeks, then I see 
my family a few months later. That is just the way of life these days. 
I think it is also important to recognize the work required in 
negotiations with foreign governments. The Commission of In-
quiry'S Report made it very clear that success depends upon this 
type of cooperation. 58 The government agreed with Mr. Justice 
Deschenes' recommendation that no evidence should be gathered 
in any Eastern European country that did not accede to six condi-
tions of the taking of evidence: (i) the protection of the investigated 
individuals' reputations through strict confidentiality; (ii) the use of 
independent interpreters; (iii) access to original documents where 
relevant; (iv) access to witnesses' previous statements; (v) examina-
tion of witnesses in accord with the Canadian rules of evidence; and 
(vi) the videotaping of witness examinations. 59 In the twenty-two 
months during which the Commission prepared its report, the Com-
mission recognized that no evidence had been obtained in Eastern 
Europe. Despite its many efforts, the Commission was largely un-
able to obtain evidence abroad. Indeed, in one particular case now 
before the courts, the government's case is built upon the testimony 
of one single individual.60 The individual had the right to object to 
taped evidence obtained by a commission in her country. She ex-
ercised that right, and we were prevented from taking her evidence. 
Now, that doesn't mean that you can't obtain any evidence in these 
57 Id. at 869-92. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 890-91. 
60 See Secretary of State v. Luitjens, [1989] 2 F.e. 125 (Vanc.). 
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proceedings; it means that these considerations must be taken into 
account in advance, before you start the prosecution. 
So the Commission's report did not present us with a panacea, 
and the Commission never suggested that it would. Since much of 
the research and investigation pertaining to war crimes and crimes 
against humanity must be carried out abroad, agreements with 
foreign governments were required. These agreements may be in 
the form of a memorandum of understanding or a diplomatic 
note-a bilateral, formal instrument by which a foreign government 
allows a Canadian team of experts to carry out investigations, gather 
evidence, and interrogate witnesses on its territory. The world has 
changed since Allan Ryan first set out on his most noble endeavor. 
The world is changing in significant ways. We found out that in 
order to get countries obligated to do this work, and to do it in a 
way that adhered closely to our six conditions, we had to enter into 
these types of arrangements. 
The inquiry of the Deschenes Commission dealt solely with 
Nazi war crimes. As a consequence, this issue was given top priority 
in the agreements Canada has negotiated with foreign governments. 
To date we have concluded arrangements with the Soviet Union, 
West Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Netherlands, Yugo-
slavia, and Hungary. I am happy to say that some of the individuals 
I met in these rounds of negotiations are participating in the various 
panels at this Conference. I think that shows you the extent to 
which international cooperation is growing in this field. 
I want to give you a general idea of the practical matters cov-
ered by these agreements. They cover the taking of evidence "by 
commission," which is where a Canadian court may go into a foreign 
country and take evidence. Commission evidence may be taken at 
the instance of the accused or at the instance of the Canadian 
prosecutor. We insist that a Canadian judge be among the commis-
sion members taking the evidence. Quite frankly, as most of these 
countries have totally different legal systems, they often view the 
requirement of a Canadian judge on the commission as an intrusion 
upon their sovereignty. But we insist on this requirement. After all, 
we will ultimately have to come back to Canada and have whatever 
evidence has been obtained admitted in a Canadian courtroom. 
Three obvious defenses will be raised at that stage: one, that the 
accused was not extended his right of proper cross-examination; 
two, that the judge did not know Canadian law; and three, that 
there was not really a trial in Canada, since the trial was held in a 
foreign country. Naturally we have concerned ourselves with antic-
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ipating the types of defenses and arguments that might be raised 
further down the line, and we believe the presence of a Canadian 
judge to make rulings of law in accordance with Canadian standards 
will be necessary to overcome such defenses. 
We also insist that the taking of commission evidence conform 
to Canadian rules of evidence and procedure. Of course, we must 
also take into account the foreign government's sovereignty and 
legal requirements for the taking of evidence. The principle I always 
put forward is that, basically, all the justice systems in the world are 
geared toward the ascertainment of truth. If we accept that prop-
osition, why should there be a stumbling block in taking evidence 
that is to be admitted in a Canadian court according to the Canadian 
rules of procedure and evidence? 
Most important from our point of view is that these formal 
arrangements are assurances to Canadians that our approach to the 
prosecution of war crimes and crimes against humanity is fair and 
effective. In the case of war crimes, the government is dealing with 
crimes that were committed on another continent over forty-five 
years ago. It is therefore particularly difficult to reconstitute the 
evidence, trace it back with any accuracy to the events in question, 
and identify the witnesses. In one case I am involved with now, 
which has run over a period of nine months, we have over fifty 
witnesses, six of them from among the world's leading historical 
experts.61 People say, "Well, why do you have to call that kind of 
evidence?" The reason is that sometimes it takes seven people to 
reconstruct a single historical event. And when you are dealing with 
a collaborator, where the activities constituting the crime were 
spread out over a long period of time and more than forty years 
ago, you need to be able to reconstruct as many events as possible. 
In order to support a charge in Canada, it must be demonstrated 
that the crime in question conforms to the definition of a "war 
crime" or "crime against humanity" in Canadian law, and that it 
would have constituted a crime in Canada at the time it was com-
mitted.62 
I do not want to sound pompous when I say this-and because 
of the criticism that continually seems to arise in Canada, I also 
don't want to sound defensive-but I really think that Canadians 
have a right to be a part of the actions taken by their government 
61 See id. 
62 Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 6(1.91), (1.96) (1985), amended by ch. 37, 1987 S.C. 
1105. 
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in response to the Commission's report. In addition to the afore-
mentioned Criminal Code Amendments, our Immigration Act was 
revised last year to prevent the future entry of war criminals into 
Canada.63 Amendments were also made to the Citizenship Act that 
make war crimes a bar to obtaining Canadian citizenship, and that 
authorize the development and implementation of a screening pro-
cess for individuals seeking entry into Canada.64 
We also have two cases currently pending in our courts, both 
of which I would like to discuss briefly. In the case of Regina v. 
Finta,65 a direct indictment was preferred by the Attorney General 
of Canada on August 18, 1988, charging Mr. Finta with kidnapping, 
illegal confinement, robbery, and manslaughter-these crimes hav-
ing taken place in Hungary in June, 1944.66 On October 6, 1988, 
the Ontario Supreme Court ordered rogatory commission evidence 
to be taken in Hungary and Israel. This evidence has already been 
taken in Israel and is currently being taken in Hungary. A trial date 
in the Supreme Court of Ontario has been set for June 5, 1989. 
One of the issues that will doubtless be raised at that time is the 
constitutionality of the Criminal Code Amendments. 
Proceedings in Secretary of State v. Luitjens,67 a revocation of 
citizenship case, are currently before the federal court of Vancou-
ver. Mr. Lui~ens is accused of not revealing to Canadian authorities 
that he was convicted in Holland for war crimes; the result of a trial 
in absentia that was held at the conclusion of the war. Also, the 
government alleges that Mr. Lui~ens' activities as a Nazi collaborator 
and a member of the auxiliary Landwacht were such that he should 
have revealed them to the Canadian authorities as part of their 
assessment of suitable character in granting him Canadian citizen-
ship.68 This trial started in Vancouver on September 26, 1988; 
rogatory commission evidence was taken in Holland in October and 
November, 1988; the trial resumed on January 4, 1989, was contin-
ued on March 1, 1989, and is scheduled to be resumed on April 3, 
1989. 
I would like to take a moment now to thank a colleague of 
mine, Dr. Paul Brillman,69 who is scheduled to speak in a subsequent 
6S Immigration Act, R.S.C., ch. 1-2 (1977), amended fry ch. 37,1987 S.C. 1105, 1110-14. 
64 Citizenship Act, R.S.C., ch. C-29 (1976), amended fry ch. 37, 1987 S.C. 1l05, 1114-15. 
65 [1990] 69 O.R.(2d) 557 (H.C.J.). 
66 [d. at 563-64. 
67 [1989] 2 F.C. 125 (Vane.). 
68 [d. at 133. 
69 Dr. Paul Brillman is Special Prosecutor for War Crimes in Holland. 
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panel and whom you have all come to know. In prosecuting the 
Luitjens case, the cooperation between Holland and Canada has been 
absolutely outstanding. There have been times when Canada has 
been accused of moving too fast and too hard in this case, and Paul 
Brillman has always been there to offer the assistance of the Dutch 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Special Police Investigation Unit, 
under his direction and control. One of the members of the Special 
Police Investigation Unit, Inspector Coppe, will always be remem-
bered by me for two things: his independence-which frankly some-
times left us wondering where we were-and his dedication. If it 
were not for the dedication of people like Paul Brillman and his 
colleague Inspector Coppe, we would never be able to get these 
cases resolved. To them, I would like to extend our heartfelt thanks. 
I will conclude with two comments. First, I would like to make 
absolutely clear that when the Canadian Department of Justice does 
not talk about its cases and is silent, or when it does not comment 
on its investigations and is silent, this is not a silence that is designed 
to withhold information. Rather, the silence of the Department of 
Justice on such matters is its solemn obligation under Canadian law. 
At the Human Rights Conference last year at McGill University, the 
Attorney General put it this way: 
It is to the need to protect the rights of the accused that I wish 
to address the last of my remarks today. Our legal process must 
continue to maintain the highest standards of law and evidence. 
As I am sure you are well aware, it is customary to refrain from 
commenting on the specifics of criminal cases under investiga-
tion. If the government has evidence concerning alleged crim-
inal acts by individuals, there is only one proper forum for its 
release, and that is in the court after a charge has been laid. 
Our Canadian criminal justice system and fundamental princi-
ples of fairness dictate that the names of subjects not be released. 
Those who have used such an approach, and those who are 
tempted to do so, should reflect upon the obstacles they create 
to a fair trial. 70 
For example, imagine that we were to identify a subject in a very 
short period of time, and in the investigation we discovered that 
the name of the subject and the town from which the subject emi-
grated were correct, but the subject's birthday was totally wrong-
not just wrong by months, but years. What if you were to go on in 
the investigation and discover that the subject you had named was 
not the correct person at all? That may be a trite expression of the 
70 Attorney General of Canada, Speech at McGill University (Feb. 1987). 
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principle, but it is important. It is my belief, and I think from what 
the Attorney General stated that it is his belief as well, that laws 
and mechanisms should be established in Canada that bring war 
criminals to justice and address past evils whenever it is legally 
possible to do so. Such laws and mechanisms will also go a long way 
toward preventing future wrongs. 
Second, I never lose my calm when people ask, "What has 
happened to the other twenty cases?" I simply tell them to look at 
what Mr. Justice Deschenes' Report really said, and invite them to 
deal with this issue in a positive manner, as we are doing in a 
Conference such as this. You cannot do this work unless you are 
sufficiently committed. You cannot do this work unless you are of 
sufficient will. In Canada, all of these things have been demon-
strated. One thing I will never do, and no one in my section will 
ever do, is get upset with people who understandably get upset with 
us. We understand why you get upset, but that is not going to 
change our dedication; it is not going to change our will. So, if you 
do not see Bill Hobson react to criticism, it is not because I have 
nerves of steel, but because I find criticism very healthy. I happen 
to work in a system where everything is a matter of public record, 
so I will let the record be examined in another five years to see 
whether the words I am speaking today bear themselves out. I 
would like to take this opportunity to thank Allan for sharing his 
time. We would also like to thank Boston College for giving Cana-
dians an opportunity to participate in this Confei"ence. Thank you 
very much. 
Allan Ryan: Thank you, Bill. I think it is a mark of the reputation 
of this Conference that prosecutors from as far away as Australia 
have come to participate. I would like to introduce Graham Blewitt, 
who is currently the Deputy Legal Director of the Special Investi-
gations Unit, an agency which was established by the Australian 
Attorney General's Department to investigate the commission of 
war crimes by Australian citizens. Graham was appointed to this 
position in September, while he was serving as the senior legal 
advisor to the National Crime Authority. Prior to that, he gained 
twenty years of prosecutorial experience in several federal and state 
positions in Australia. 
Graham Blewitt: I would like to commence by reviewing the prose-
cution of citizens in Australia immediately after the Second World 
War. I will briefly trace the history of these prosecutions through 
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the passage of the 1988 War Crimes Amendment Act7l and outline 
the main cases under the legislation. I will conclude my discussion 
by raising some of the political issues involved in the passage of the 
Australian legislation. 
Following the end of World War II in 1945, Australia was, like 
many other countries, involved in the prosecution of persons who 
committed crimes related to the war. In 1945, the Australian Par-
liament enacted the War Crimes Act.72 The Act provided for the 
punishment of "war crimes" as defined therein, including violations 
of the law and usages of war committed in any place whatsoever-
within or beyond Australia-during any war.73 Proceedings under 
the Act were conducted by a military tribunal, which was authorized 
to impose penalties ranging from fines and confiscation of property 
to imprisonment for life.74 The Act was fairly restrictive in that it 
applied only to war crimes committed against citizens of Australia, 
British subjects, or the citizens of any Allied power.75 The Act was 
applied to a great number of trials in the Pacific region in the 
immediate post-war period, but has not been invoked by the Aus-
tralian government since then. 
Following the war, the government, cognizant of the geo-
graphic size of Australia and the country's relatively small popula-
tion, and concerned with the plight of the many thousands of 
refugees crowded into displaced persons camps throughout Eu-
rope, adopted a policy of "populate or perish."76 Pursuant to that 
policy, many thousands of migrants were selected to enter into the 
country. During the period between 1946 and 1959, some 1.2 mil-
lion people migrated to Australia; 250,000 of these were refugees 
who were unwilling or unable to return to their country of origin 
following the war. This level of migration represents one of the 
largest movements of people from one hemisphere to another in 
history. 
It is now apparent that among the many migrants accepted by 
Australia during this period were a significant number of persons 
71 AUSTL. C. ACTS, No.3 (1989) (amending AUSTL. C. ACTS, XLIII, § 3, No. 48 (1945» 
(copy on file at the Boston College Third World Law Journal office). 
72 AUSTL. C. ACTS, XLIII, § 3, No. 48 (1945) (amended 1989) (copy on file at the Boston 
College Third World Law Journal office). 
7. /d. 
74 Id. § 11. 
7. Id. §§ 7, 12. 
76 See generally Phillip Lynch, Australian Immigration Policy, in AUSTRALIAN IMMIGRATION 
POLICY (Hew Roberts ed., 1972). 
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who had committed war crimes. These persons were presumably 
able to blend in with the genuine refugees Australia had sought to 
admit. From time to time, allegations were made that war criminals 
had entered Australia after World War II, but these claims were 
generally either rejected or ignored. In 1986, a radio program went 
to air that presented irrefutable evidence of the presence in Aus-
tralia of war criminals who had never been made to account for 
their crimes. In response to growing pressure following this broad-
cast, the government of Australia appointed a man named Andrew 
Menzies, a former senior public servant, to review the material 
related to the entry of suspected war criminals into Australia.77 
Following his review, Menzies submitted a report to the Australian 
government which provided evidence that there were indeed war 
criminals living in Australia.78 The government's response was to 
establish a Special Investigations Unit (SIU) to investigate allega-
tions against specific persons living in Australia-the Unit of which 
I am the Deputy Director. 
The SIU is a part of the Attorney General's Department of 
Australia. In conjunction with the creation of the Unit, the govern-
ment also put forward a number of amendments to the 1945 War 
Crimes Act, an initiative which ultimately led to the passage of the 
War Crimes Amendment Act of 1988. I will have more to say about 
that Act later in the discussion. It is the function of SIU to gather 
evidence related to persons who are alleged to have committed war 
crimes. This evidence will eventually enable the government to place 
these persons on trial before Australian juries on war crimes offen-
ses, rather than seeking their deportation or extradition. 
The SIU has received in excess of 560 allegations relating to 
the commission of war crimes. Of this number, some 276 investi-
gations are currently ongoing.79 By and large, the allegations re-
ceived by SIU involve persons who are accused of committing 
crimes in the Baltic states-Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia-and in 
Byelorussia, Hungary, and Yugoslavia. While a number of German 
nationals did migrate to Australia after the war, most of these 
persons have either returned to Germany or died. Of the 276 
current investigations, SIU is concentrating on the more serious or 
high-profile cases. Such cases generally involve allegations of mass 
murder. 
77 Australia Links 70 to War Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1986, at 8. 
78 [d. 
79 See Special Investigations Unit Annual Report 1989 (copy on file at the Boston College 
Third World Law Journal office). 
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Although 276 cases are being investigated, it is highly likely 
that only a very small percentage of these cases will actually result 
in prosecutions. It is interesting that in a majority of the SIU's cases, 
the question of the subject's identification is not likely to become a 
major issue. Rather, we expect that persons under investigation will 
contend that they did not commit the acts alleged against them; 
that is, they will say that the allegations against them are either false 
or fabricated. The investigations being carried out by the SIU have 
been greatly assisted by the existence of good-quality photographs 
taken of the persons under investigation when they migrated to 
Australia immediately following World War II. These photographs 
are very useful in helping our witnesses to identify suspects. 
Regarding SIU's investigations of war crimes committed in the 
Baltic states, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Byelorussia, it is necessary 
to rely on the Soviet Union to supply relevant documentation sup-
porting the allegations against persons thought to be living in Aus-
tralia. We have been somewhat frustrated in trying to obtain prompt 
responses to our requests from the Soviet Union. Recent develop-
ments, however, suggest that the Soviets will be more responsive in 
the future to requests for this material. Perhaps one reason for the 
Soviets' delay has merely been the competition that has arisen 
among the various countries seeking prosecution of these war crim-
inals. 
I mentioned that it is the function of the SIU to gather evidence 
that will lead to the prosecution of these war criminals. It is worth 
repeating, however, that any prosecution that does take place will 
be conducted in the Australian criminal courts before juries. Fur-
thermore, it will be necessary in any such trial for the government 
to establish the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. It 
is therefore incumbent upon the prosecution to establish by cogent 
evidence that the accused is guilty of war crimes. This approach is 
somewhat different from that prevailing in the United States. With-
out oversimplifying matters, the situation in the United States is 
that proceedings are initiated against war criminals to deprive them 
of their citizenship and, in appropriate cases, to deport them. so 
Australia, however, unlike the United States, is a signatory to the 
United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.Sl 
Broadly speaking, this means that the Australian government is not 
80 See, e.g., Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981). 
81 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, opened for signature Aug. 30, 1961, 989 
U.N.T.S. 175. 
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able to divest a person of his or her citizenship and to reduce that 
person to a position of statelessness. 
I would like to return to the War Crimes Amendment Act of 
1988. This Act amends the 1945 War Crimes Act to provide for the 
prosecution of Australian citizens or persons residing in Australia 
who are alleged to have committed war crimes. The Act applies to 
war crimes committed against any person in Europe from Septem-
ber 1, 1939 to May 8, 1956.82 For an act committed overseas to be 
classified a war crime, it must have been an offense under Australian 
criminal law at the time it was committed.83 In addition, the crime 
must be shown to be part of a war or conflict in the manner set 
forth by the Act.84 Although the acts that satisfy these tests would 
also be war crimes under international law, Australian courts will 
not be required to apply international law in determining whether 
a crime has been committed. 
The Act specifically excludes any defense based on orders from 
a superior officer85-an exclusion which is consistent with the post-
war proceedings at Nuremberg.86 It does provide, however, that the 
accused may assert a defense that the act alleged to be an offense 
was in fact permitted by the laws of war and was not committed as 
a crime against humanity under international law. 87 The maximum 
penalty for an offense under the Act, which is reserved for the 
crime of willful killing, is imprisonment for life, although lesser 
terms may also be imposed.88 For any other offense, the maximum 
sentence is twenty-five years in prison.89 
The Act was passed by the Australian Parliament on December 
21, 1988, and came into force on January 25, 1989. The Act sub-
stantially repeals the provisions of the 1945 Act and commences 
with the following preamble: 
WHEREAS 
A) concern has arisen that a significant number of persons 
who have committed serious war crimes in Europe during 
World War II may since have entered Australia and become 
Australian citizens or businesses; 
82 War Crimes Amendment Act, §§ 3(a), 5. 
83 [d. § 6. 
84 [d. § 7. 
85 [d. § 16. 
86 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of European 
Axis, opened/or signature Aug. 8,1945, art. VII, 59 Stat. 1544, 1548,82 V.N.T.S. 279, 288. 
87 War Crimes Amendment Act, § 17. 
88 [d. § 10(1). 
89 [d. § 10(2). 
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B) it is appropriate that the persons accused of such war 
crimes be brought to trial in the ordinary criminal courts in 
Australia; and 
C) it is also essential, in the interest of justice, that a person 
so accused be given a fair trial, with all the safeguards for 
accused persons in trials in those courts, having particular re-
gard to matters such as the gravity of the allegations and the 
lapse of time since the alleged crimes.90 
The Act provides that a person who, during the period covered by 
the Act, committed a war crime is guilty of an "indictable offense" 
against the Act-that is, guilty of an offense that is triable on in-
dictment before ajury.91 In Australia, criminal juries are composed 
of twelve persons. The Act defines a person accused of war crimes 
as any natural person who is an Australian citizen, a resident of 
Australia, a British subject, or a citizen of a country allied with 
Australia in the conduct of war.92 The same Act defines war as any 
armed conflict between countries, whether declared as war or not, 
or any civil war or similar armed conflict, so long as it occurred in 
Europe during the period covered by the Act.93 
War crimes are dealt with in Section 7 of the Act. This section 
provides that a "serious crime" is a "war crime" if it were committed 
(1) in the course of hostilities in a war; (2) in the course of an 
occupation; (3) in pursuit of a policy associated with the conduct of 
a war or occupation; or (4) on behalf of, or in the interests of a 
power conducting a war or engaged in an occupation.94 This section 
further provides that a "serious crime" is a "war crime" when it is 
committed (1) in the course of political, racial, or religious perse-
cution; (2) with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national 
ethnic, racial, or religious group as such; and (3) in the territory of 
the country that was then involved in the war or that was the subject 
of invasion.95 
Section 6 of the Act deals with what I would call "serious 
crimes." This section provides that an act is a "serious crime" when, 
if it had been committed in a part of Australia under the law then 
in force in that part, it would have constituted an offense such as 
murder, rape, wounding, and so on.96 The section also provides 
90 !d. § 3. 
91 [d. § 9. 
92 [d. § 5. 
93 [d. 
94 [d. § 7. 
95 [d. 
96 [d. § 6(1). 
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that an act is a "serious crime" if (1) it were committed outside of 
Australia during the period covered by the Act, and (2) would have 
been a "serious crime" under the law of some part of Australia at 
the time it was committed.97 The section further provides that the 
deportation of any person to-or the internment of any person in-
a death camp, slave labor camp, or any place where a person was 
subjected to treatment substantially similar to that prevailing in a 
death or slave labor camp, is a "serious crime."98 The section also 
defines "serious crimes" for persons who were aiders, abettors, or 
conspirators to the commission of serious crimes.99 
The intent of the War Crimes Amendment Act of 1988 is to 
characterize, in terms already found in Australian law, the acts 
defined as "war crimes" under international law. A list of offenses 
contained in Section 6 generally describes actual offenses existing 
under the laws of each state and territory in Australia as in force 
from time to time during the period covered by the Act. IOO Section 
6 also allows an Australian court to take into consideration any 
defense that may have been viable in a proceeding conducted in 
the state or territory defining the offense. 101 
Section 11 is one of the sections dealing with the adjudication 
of cases. It provides that a person shall not be charged with an 
offense unless he or she is an Australian citizen or resident of 
Australia. lo2 The possibility of private citizens bringing private ac-
tions against an accused war criminal is specifically excluded by 
Section 12, which provides that prosecutions under the Act may 
only be comm~nced by the Attorney General or the Director of 
Public Prosecutions. !Os 
Section 16 excludes defenses based on the receipt of orders 
from a superior officer or authority.l04 The provision states, how-
ever, that where a defendant is determined to have acted in fact 
under orders from his superiors, that fact may be taken into account 
in determining the proper sentence. 105 Section 17 deals with de-
fenses based on the laws, customs, or usages of war. The purpose 
97 [d. § 6(3). 
98 [d. § 6(4). 
99 [d. § 6(5). 
100 [d. § 6. 
101 [d. § 6(2). 
10. [d. § 11. 
lOS [d. § 12. 
104 [d. § 16. 
105 [d. 
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of this section is to ensure that a person charged with an offense 
under the Act will not be convicted of the offense if he or she can 
raise credible evidence that his or her actions were not contrary to 
the laws, customs, or usages of war and did not constitute crimes 
against humanity. Such a defendant will not be convicted unless the 
prosecution can rebut this evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. 
It may be interesting to touch on some of the concerns that 
arose during the passage of the War Crimes Amendment Bill 
through the Australian Parliament. A great deal of public debate 
was generated by the Bill, and perhaps the most contentious issue 
was whether Australian ex-servicemen would be exposed to liability 
as potential war criminals. The government took the firm stand 
that, although the legislation was aimed at those responsible for the 
mass exterminations in Europe during the war, there could be no 
justification in light of Australia's international obligations for ex-
cluding the prosecution of Australian ex-servicemen if evidence that 
they were involved in war crimes were to come forward. Despite a 
very strong push from pressure groups, and from the Parliamentary 
opposition themselves, the War Crimes Amendment Act makes no 
exception for Australia's own servicemen. Another matter that 
caused some controversy-and, to a certain extent, still does-was 
whether it is simply too late to pursue war criminals for offenses 
committed more than forty years ago outside Australia. An associ-
ated concern was with the huge cost involved in resolving these 
prosecutions. These issues generated much debate, but ultimately 
had no bearing on the Act's passage through Parliament. 
Suggestions were made from time to time that the main reason 
the government was seeking to introduce the legislation was to 
appease Jewish demands that action be taken to bring war criminals 
living in Australia to justice. The government rejected such claims. 
The various Jewish organizations in Australia, and the Jewish com-
munity itself, kept a very low profile during the debate over the 
Act. In a recent Australian television program, the question was put 
to Mr. Izzy Liebler, the Chairman of the Executive Council of 
Australian Jewry ,whether the War Crimes Amendment Act might 
arouse anti-Semitic feelings or give rise to reprisals against the 
Jewish community. Mr. Liebler responded that if the price of bring-
ing war criminals to justice were a backlash toward Australian Jews, 
then this would simply be the price that would have to be paid. 
The final points I would like to touch on are the various safe-
guards included in the War Crimes Amendment Act. First, where 
extradition is sought by the government under the existing extra-
1992] HOLOCAUST AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 1989 31 
dition laws, a magistrate is required to be satisfied not only that 
there is a reasonable basis for believing that the offenses for which 
surrender is sought constitute "war crimes," but also that the gov-
ernment has established a prima facie case that the person accused 
committed the extraditable offense. 106 That is to say that before 
granting the extradition, the magistrate must conclude that the 
evidence provided by the government in support of the extradition 
request would be sufficient under Australian law to warrant the 
accused being put on trial in a criminal court. 107 This provision has 
effect despite any law or treaty to the contrary, and departs from 
the modern approach to extradition in that it requires the magis-
trate to be satisfied to an unusually high standard. 
Second, the Act authorizes the Attorney General to approve 
legal or financial assistance for an applicant who is charged with an 
offense under the Act. I08 Third, the Act provides that the normal 
rules of evidence and procedure are applicable to all common law 
defenses raised in proceedings under the Act, and that courts hear-
ing such cases may exercise all powers granted to them by these 
rules, including the powers necessary to prevent an abuse of pro-
cess. 109 Fourth, a trial judge may, in the interest of justice, stay the 
proceedings if (1) the defendant is unable to obtain exculpatory 
evidence that would have been available but for the lapse of time 
or some other factor beyond the defendant's control and (2) is 
thereby prejudiced in the preparation or conduct of his defense. 110 
Fifth, the Act provides that the defendant may apply to have the 
proceedings removed to another state. III The court is required to 
allow the defendant's request for removal unless the defendant is a 
resident of the state or territory where the proceedings are being 
conducted, or is not a resident of the state or territory to which he 
seeks to have the proceedings removed. 112 Only the Attorney Gen-
eral or the Director of Public Prosecutions may commence an action 
against a suspected war criminal. Thank you very much. 
Allan Ryan: Mr. William Chalmers was appointed to the British War 
Crimes Inquiry in February, 1988. The Inquiry's task is to consider 
106 [d. § 22. 
107 [d. § 19. 
108 [d. § 13. 
109 [d. § 13(5). 
110 [d. § 14. 
111 !d. 
112 [d. § 14(4). 
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whether British law should be amended to allow for the prosecution 
of Nazi war criminals. Mr. Chalmers also served as the Crown's 
agent for Scotland prior to his appointment to the War Crimes 
Inquiry.113 
William Chalmers: I would like to thank those responsible for orga-
nizing this Conference for inviting me here today. What has hap-
pened in Britain over the last forty years to facilitate the prosecution 
of Nazi war criminals? The short answer to this question is "noth-
ing;" we have had no prosecutions, or undertaken any other positive 
acts. There has been a great deal of criticism about that, however. 
In Parliament, a group representing all political parties has 
banded together to try to persuade the government to take some 
action. The media has been very critical. We have become accus-
tomed to the sort of banner headline, "Britain: A Haven for War 
Criminals." Eventually, the government decided last year to take 
action, but only to the extent of setting up a War Crimes Inquiry. 
To carry out this Inquiry, the government brought back a couple 
of old war horses who had quietly gone to graze: my colleague, Sir 
Thomas Hetherington, who was Director of Public Prosecutions for 
England and Wales, and myself. The mission of the Inquiry is as 
follows: (1) to obtain and examine relevant material, including ma-
terial held by government departments, documents that have or 
may be submitted by the Simon Wiesen thaI Center, and other ma-
terials relating to possible war crimes allegations against persons 
who are now British citizens or residents in the United Kingdom; 114 
(2) to interview persons who appear to possess relevant information 
relating to such allegations; (3) to consider, in light of the likely 
probative value of any evidence collected through research or wit-
nesses, whether the laws of the United Kingdom should be amended 
to allow for the prosecution of war criminals who are now British 
citizens or residents in the United Kingdom; and (4) to advise Her 
Majesty's government accordingly. In short, the functions of the 
Inquiry are to consider whether the law should be amended to 
prosecute someone in our courts who was neither a British citizen 
nor in Britain at the time he committed a crime, and to investigate 
113 The Crown Agent for Scotland also serves as the head of the Procurator Fiscal's 
Service-the prosecution agency in Scotland (footnote provided by panelist). 
114 For purposes of this Inquiry, the term "war crimes" extends only to crimes of murder, 
manslaughter, or genocide committed in Germany or in the territories occupied by German 
forces during the Second World War (footnote provided by panelist). 
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allegations. In this respect, the Inquiry is somewhat different from 
the Deschenes Commission in Canada and the Menzies Inquiry in 
Australia, in that we are obliged to go abroad and determine 
whether there appears to be a prima facie case against anyone. 
You will gather that this is very much a restricted' undertaking. 
We are concerned only with the Second World War. We are con-
cerned only with acts committed in Germany or in the territories 
occupied by Germany. We are concerned only with persons who 
were not British at the time they committed such crimes, but who 
are now British citizens or resident in Britain. In connection with 
the task of deciding whether to change the law, the slant in the 
United Kingdom is toward the type of legislation that has been 
enacted in Canada and Australia, and not toward the type of pro-
ceedings that take place in the United States. Naturally, we have 
been looking very carefully at what the Canadians and the Austra-
lians have done. Although in broad principle, these two countries 
may appear to have done the same thing, the actual legislation 
contains considerable variations. 
We are at a stage where we are agonizing over the question 
whether to do anything or not. Canada, Australia, and the United 
States have all been through this process, but the question is brand 
new to us. On the one hand, there are many arguments in favor of 
doing nothing. The legal purists do not like extraterritorial juris-
diction. They also do not like retrospective legislation, although we 
are not so much declaring a new crime retrospectively as we are 
making it competent procedurally to do something that one could 
not competently do forty years ago. Further, there are the semi-
legal objections having to do with the difficulties of obtaining evi-
dence. In Britain, we are fairly strong in our adherence to a best 
evidence rule, whereby evidence is to be given orally, in court, and 
in the presence of judge, jury, and the accused. 1l5 
As we have gone about the world, we have encountered great 
cooperation in pursuing our investigations. Even in the Soviet 
Union, we are now being told that witnesses whose testimony we 
seek to obtain may be allowed to travel to Britain to give evidence, 
so long as they are well enough and willing to do so. Of course, 
many difficulties remain in this regard, as many witnesses are old, 
infirm, and simply unfit to travel. Also, many potential witnesses 
are dead, although their statements have often been recorded be-
115 See generally M.N. HOWARD ET. AL., PHIPSON ON EVIDENCE 117-22 (l4th ed. 1990); 
RUPERT CROSS, EVIDENCE § 3, at 11-13 (3rd ed. 1967). 
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fore their deaths. These are obstacles that would seem to me to be 
insuperable in the proper conduct of an investigation. Yet, the 
Canadians and Australians have obviously surmounted these prob-
lems and provided the solutions in their legislation. I suppose that 
the stronger arguments are to be found in the area of public policy. 
The question before us is, should we do this? What is to be 
gained by sending a seventy year-old man to prison for the rest of 
his days for something he did a half century ago? It is said that 
Nuremburg was sufficient, that it dealt with the "big fish"-the 
Goerings and so on. If one is looking for justification in prosecution, 
one will find it at Nuremberg, since these trials will surely be a 
deterrent to others who may contemplate such policies in the future. 
Clearly, the allegations that have been made in our current inves-
tigations concern primarily the little ones, the "small fish"-not the 
people who determined policy but the people who pulled the trig-
gers. Some would argue that we should not concern ourselves with 
these little ones, that we should leave matters be and focus our 
attentions on the future. 
Another argument is that Britain simply does not have the 
resources to conduct these prosecutions thoroughly. Those of you 
in law enforcement will recognize that you never have the money 
or the resources for everything you hope to accomplish. Indeed, I 
used to think my biggest arguments were not in court seeking a 
conviction, but in my battles with the Treasury. It is undoubtedly 
true that money and resources are very tight. The ordinary crime, 
which must be dealt with, is always getting larger; the trials seem 
to take longer and there are often specific and novel problems that 
must be addressed. For example, when Pan Am flight 103 crashed 
in Lockerbie, Scotland a few months ago, resources had to be di-
verted. The police, the other investigators, the forensic scientists, 
the pathologists, and the prosecutors were all there, beavering away, 
in the sleepy little town of Lockerbie where the crime rate is prac-
tically nil. That is the sort of thing that happens, and the agency 
must be able to provide for these unforeseeable contingencies out 
of its already-tight budget. 
If it were said, "All right, go ahead and pursue these investi-
gations and prosecutions," the representatives of every political 
lobby would say, "Don't waste our money on that, buy some more 
hospital beds instead." Educators would say, "We could build a 
better school with that money." And there would be others who 
would say, "If you want to use that money to relieve suffering, what 
about famine relief for Third World countries?" There are always 
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plenty of ways for public money to be expended, and our task is to 
assess the priority of a matter such as the prosecution of war crimes. 
As Allan Ryan so clearly said in his book, Quiet Neighbors,1l6 
these people whom we seek to punish have been in our country for 
more than forty years; they have kept their heads down, their noses 
clean, and they have posed no particular problems. They are "good 
citizens," you might say. Do we owe them something for their good 
citizenship over the last forty years? Then, of course, there are the 
people who say that the Holocaust never happened, and that we 
should discount the evidence produced by the Soviet Union as a 
sinister plot to discredit the refugees living abroad. On the other 
side of all this, the argument is very simple and very clear: nothing 
should prevent the punishment of those responsible for the hor-
rendous atrocities of the Holocaust. These are the issues on which 
we have to deliberate. As I said, although these questions are fa-
miliar in other countries, they are new to us. 
We have carried out a number of investigations in various parts 
of the world to see whether there are cases that appear to be worthy 
of prosecution. We hope to make our report in a few months' time. 
We have not finalized our report and I cannot tell you what it will 
say or what our recommendations will be. In any event, it is ulti-
mately for the government to decide what to do in light of the 
report. And, of course, even if the government does decide to enact 
enabling legislation, it is still for the appropriate prosecutor to 
decide whether or not to prosecute. These are purely matters of 
conjecture. All I can say at this time is thank you for allowing me 
to be here. Having had the opportunity to listen to the other panel-
ists, I have hopefully learned from the experience. 
116 See generally RYAN, supra note 15. 

